CIVIL DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES
January 1997 (vol. 13, #2) 1601 N Tucson Blvd #9, Tucson AZ 85716 c 1997 Physicians for Civil Defense
UNILATERAL DEFENSELESSNESS
In the 1980s, groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and Physicians for Social Responsibility toured the nation, calling for a Nuclear Freeze.
At one such meeting, the question was asked: aren't you calling for unilateral disarmament of the United States?
This was met with vehement denial. The focus was said to be on the U.S. because Americans can influence only U.S. policy; moreover, economic strength (achieved by decreased military spending) was essential to our Superpower status.
We hear no calls for a Nuclear Freeze in the 1990s. But why should we? One of its advocates
-Madeleine Albright-is now Secretary of State. And while much of the Peace Movement's agenda was controversial, and probably never could have been enacted by Congress, it nonetheless happened quietly.With barely an audible whisper of dissent, the U.S. destroyed neutron bombs and tactical nuclear weapons (which might be useful in defending its borders against invasion) and its nuclear weapons manufacturing capability (the sites now being devoted to environmental cleansing). Its strategic deterrent drifts toward obsolescence, and nuclear testing is now done by computer simulation only. Its conventional forces have deteriorated to the point that the U.S. would probably be incapable of an effort comparable to Desert Storm (Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, National Review, Dec. 23, 1996).
Now, U.S. economic strength is also threatened by an increasing burden of ``environmental regulations,'' even without the crippling expense of ``stabilizing greenhouse emissions,'' the new focus of activism by Freeze proponents. (The net discounted cost of reducing emissions to 1990 levels is estimated to be $7 trillion, according to a study by the Center for the Study of American Business, available at http://csab.wustl.edu (``The Quiet Reversal of US Climate Change Policy'').
At the End of the Cold War, tensions relaxed so much that no public alarm followed the allegation that the whereabouts of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces is sometimes unknown (Gary Aldrich, Unlimited Access). This is all the more remarkable since ``this may be the first modern war...wherein the vanquished was allowed to retain its entire military force'' (John B. (Jay) Stewart, Jr., Rethinking the Unthinkable: Russia's Evolving Nuclear Weapons Threat, George C. Marshall Institute, Apr. 11, 1996). Moreover, the U.S. appears to base its entire post-War defense strategy on implicit trust in the good intentions of the former ``Evil Empire.''
Even an open threat from China to hit Los Angeles with a nuclear-tipped warhead caused no outcry to defend America, and discussion of a theater defense (say in the third world) is fraught with controversy. The Clinton Administration has refused to comply with the Ballistic Missile Defense Act that Bill Clinton signed into law, leading 41 Republican Congressman to file a federal law suit in an attempt to force compliance (Wall St J, 1/22/97). The Administration seeks to expand the ABM Treaty.
The rationale for leaving America undefended is contained in the 1996 Democratic platform: ``Today, not a single Russian missile points at our children, and through the START treaties, we will cut American and Russian nuclear arsenals by two-thirds from their Cold War height.''
But are we really safe? Russian officers claim that it would take only 10 or 15 minutes to retarget the missiles. Stewart states that the time would be more like three minutes, and in any case, ``we have no idea of whether they have actually retargeted anything'' (ibid.). Furthermore, the ``No-First Use'' doctrine was officially renounced in Nov., 1993, and U.S. Defense Secretary Perry was officially notified of this in 1994. Ironically, Stewart states, START II might have encouraged the resuscitation of the first-strike concept by reducing the arsenal that would need to be destroyed to prevent retaliation to a level of 3,000 to 5,000 warheads. In any event Russia at present has between 17,000-23,000 nuclear warheads, and there is no evidence that the control system has not degraded in the chaos of the present Russian economy. (Others say that Russia still has 25,000 ready and 75,000 semi-ready nuclear weapons, including 6,000 missiles capable of reaching the U.S.
-JKC de Courcy, Intelligence Digest 9/20/96).And how many Russian warheads have been dismantled? According to Stewart, ``no U.S. eyes have ever actually physically witnessed the dismantling of a warhead...We have to...accept the Russian military's word that the materials we examine have in fact been derived from a warhead.''
There has even been a largely unreported Russian nuclear alert, in January, 1995, in response to a false warning triggered by the launch of a Norwegian meteorological satellite. ``One U.S. expert described this threat miscalculation as coming closer to a Russian nuclear launch than at any previous time..., including during the height of the Cuban missile crisis'' (Stewart, op. cit.) This time, there was no duck-and-cover drill.
Russia aside, 25 countries may be acquiring ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction, ``the weapon of choice for international coercion,'' according to Angelo Codevilla (``Defenseless America,'' Commentary Sept. 1996). ``While we go on dithering, others go on buying, building, and laying their plans.''
What is to be done? Codevilla states that ``technically, defending against ballistic missiles presents a challenge not much greater than building them.'' The viability of the key Brilliant Pebbles technology was demonstrated by the launch of the Clementine rocket in 1993. This first mission to the Moon in 20 years mapped the entire surface of the Moon before swinging into deep space, where it is now ``lost and gone forever'' (The Shield Nov/Dec 96). The entire Dec. 16, 1994, issue of Science was devoted to the preliminary results. (An update on strategic defense technology is scheduled for the June 14-15 meeting of DDP).
Stewart notes that the major nuclear powers now allocate about 100 times as much to deterrence as to prevention, mitigation, and protection from nuclear catastrophes. And strategic defenses are not the only lack: ``As a form of worst case planning, the U.S. government should prepare for post-nuclear attack measures that can be used to mitigate and recover from the catastrophic damage and loss of life that will occur if a nuclear warhead ever detonates in one or more large U.S. cities. At the moment, the nation seems totally unprepared for this unthinkable possibility.''